

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11

OMB-01 SAM-01 DRC-01 /162 W
----- 097440

R 041851Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2327

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 3026
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SECTION INFORMATION)
MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: HUNGARIAN PLENARY STATEMENT
OF APRIL 4, 1974

SUMMARY: STATEMENT DELIVERED BY HUNGARIAN REPRESENTATIVE
HELD NO SURPRISES OR NEW IDEAS. IT REPEATED WARSAW
PACT DEMANDS THAT REDUCTIONS INCLUDE FORCES OF ALL 11
PARTICIPANTS FROM THE VERY OUTSET, AND FOR INCLUSION
OF GROUND, AIR, AND NUCLEAR FORCES. HE DESCRIBED
ALLIED PROPOSALS TO RESTRICT REDUCTIONS TO GROUND FORCES
AS A "PRECONDITION WHICH COULD LEAD US TO INSURMOUNTABLE
DIFFICULTIES" AND EVOKE, "DOUBTS AND SUSPICIONS AS
TO THEIR PURPOSE." HUNGARIAN REP SAID ALLIED STRESS
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ON DISPARITIES WAS SIMPLY A MEANS WHEREBY THE WESTERN

PARTICIPANTS WERE TRYING TO CHANGE THE HISTORICALLY DETERMINED FORCE RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAD ENSURED PEACE IN EUROPE. UNEQUAL REDUCTIONS, HE SAID, WERE "UNREALISTIC AND UNACCEPTABLE." THE READINESS OF THE US TO REDUCE WAS AGAIN CONTRASTED WITH THE ALLEGED EVASION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS TO REPLY TO REPEATED EASTERN QUERIES ON THIS SUBJECT. TEXT OF HUNGARIAN STATEMENT FOLLOWS. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT.

1. TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK ON SOME QUESTIONS OF OUR DISCUSSION AND OF THE EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR PLENARY SESSIONS. I DO THIS WITH THE INTENTION OF FURTHERING AS FAR AS POSSIBLE CORRECT MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND MOVEMENT FORWARD.

2. I WILL BEGIN WITH SOME REMARKS OF A GENERAL CHARACTER.

3. AS A RESULT OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS LAST YEAR "IT WAS DECIDED TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE." PROCEEDING FROM JOINTLY ELABORATED AND ACCEPTED DOCUMENTS- I HAVE IN MIND THE PROTOCOL AND FINAL COMMUNIQUE - OUR TASK CONSISTS OF WORKING OUT A CORRESPONDING AGREEMENT ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE ALREADY AGREED AREA. THE IMMEDIACY AND AT THE SAME TIME THE COMPLEXITY OF SUCH A TASK ARE EVIDENT. CENTRAL EUROPE IS THE MAIN AREA OF CONFRONTATION OF THE TWO MILITARY/POLITICAL ALLIANCES. THE STRENGTH AND LEVEL OF PREPAREDNESS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF BOTH ALLIANCES - OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT- IN THIS AREA ARE VERY GREAT, IN CONSEQUENCE OF WHICH THE SITUATION HERE IS POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE. THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WHICH ARE IN CENTRAL EUROPE HAS THEREFORE PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE. THE CONTINUATION OF THE ARMS RACE CAN ONLY LEAD TO THE FURTHER SENSELESS WASTE OF ENORMOUS RESOURCES AND THE DEEPENING OF THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE STATES OF THE CONTINENT, TO THE WHIPPING

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UP OF TENSION AND THE GROWTH OF MILITARY DANGER.

4. GENUINE SECURITY IN EUROPE, AS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, IS UNTHINKABLE WITHOUT SPECIFIC AND EFFECTIVE STEPS ON THE ROAD TO THE WEAKENING OF THE ARMS RACE AND TO DISARMAMENT. SUCH STEPS WOULD IN THEIR TURN HAVE IMPORTANT POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES. THE ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST AND GOODWILL IN EUROPE WOULD BE STRENGTHENED, THUS FURTHERING THE WIDENING OF MUTUALLY

ADVANTAGEOUS CO-OPERATION. BETTER CONDITIONS WOULD HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR THE LESSENING OF THE BURDEN OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE.

5. I WOULD LIKE TO OBSERVE THAT IN THE BEGINNING OF THE 1970'S A FAVOURABLE ATMOSPHERE HAD COME INTO EXISTENCE FOR THE TRANS-LATION INTO REALITY OF THE IDEA OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: BOTH OF FOREIGN TROOPS SITUATED ON ALIEN TERRITORY AND OF THE TROOPS OF THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN STATES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION. THIS WAS ASSISTED BY THE GENERAL RELAXATION OF TENSION IN THE CONTINENT AND BY THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A SERIES OF INTERNATIONAL ENACTMENTS, WHICH RECORDED, IN PARTICULAR, AS ONE OF THEIR MAIN POINTS A PROVISION CONCERNING THE RENUNCIATION OF THE USE OF FORCE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.

6. WE HAVE BEEN PARTICIPATING IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING WITH A DEEP CONVICTION THAT WITH A MUTUAL STRIVING TOWARDS THE RELAXATION OF MILITARY TENSION THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS OF WORKING OUT A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES
OF THE PROBLEM OF THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. I SAID "WITH A MUTUAL STRIVING". THAT, IN OUR OPINION, SUPPOSES PRIMARILY THE NECESSITY OF THE PARTICI-PATION OF ALL POTENTIAL PARTIES TO FUTURE AGREEMENTS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING IN THE PROCESS OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE CONSIDER THAT THIS QUESTION IS OF FUNDAMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF OBTAINING CONCRETE RESULTS IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. I THINK THAT ALL THIS ALREADY BY ITSELF SUFFICIENTLY CONFIRMS THE NECESSITY OF ALL OF US, WITHOUT BEING DISTRACTED, CONCENTRATING OUR ATTENTION ON IT.

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NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11

OMB-01 SAM-01 DRC-01 /162 W
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R 041851Z APR 74
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 VIENNA 3026

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

IF ONE IS TO EXAMINT THIS QUESTION, IT IS NATURAL TO ASK WHAT PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN PRESENTED AND WHAT WE HAVE HEARD IN THIS CONNECTION SO FAR FROM THE VARIOUS PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. ON THE SIDE OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, THE DELEGATIONS OF THE GDR, POLAND, THE SOVIET UNION AND CZECHSLOVAKIA, WHICH TABLED ON 8 NOVEMBER LAST YEAR A DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, HAVE GIVEN IN THEIR STATEMENTS AN ALL-ROUND ANALYSIS OF ITS PROVISIONS AND HAVE CONVINCINGLY SHOWN THAT THE ONLY REALISTIC WAY TO MOVE FORWARD AND TO ATTAIN CONCRETE RESULTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS THE SIMULTANEOUS REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMEMENTS OF ALL ELEVEN POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING.
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8. IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT TABLED BY THE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES THERE IS ENVISAGED NOT ONLY THE SIMULTANEOUS BUT ALSO THE EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION OF FOREIGN AND NATIONAL ARMED FORCES - GROUND TROOPS, AIR FORCES, AND ALSO UNITS AND SUB-UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS - OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHO HAVE THEIR TROOPS IN THE AGREED AREA OF REDUCTION. AHD THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT, AS THE COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF ALL THE ABOVE-MENTIONED TYPES OF ARMED FORCES ARE CLOSELY LINKED TO ONE ANOTHER AND IT IS ESSENTIAL TO EXAMINE THEM AS A SINGLE COMPLEX.

9. ALSO OF IMPORTANCE IS WHAT IS ENVISAGED IN ARTICLE 6 OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, WHICH IS THAT THE BEGINNING OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD AT ONCE LEAD TO THE ENDING OF THE INCREASE OF NEW TROOPS AND ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA IN QUESTION. SUCH A BEGINNING WOULD ALREADY IN ITSELF ASSIST THE FURTHER RELAXATION OF TENSION AND THE LESSENING OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION.

10. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ON THE QUESTION OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WOULD THUS LEAD TO SUCCESSIVE REDUCTION OF THE LEVEL OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONFRONTATION IN THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE, AND TO THE LESSENING OF THE DANGER OF A MILITARY CLASH. BY THE SAME TOKEN POLITICAL DETENTE COULD BE DEEPEDED AND COMPLEMENTED BY MILITARY DETENTE BY MEANS OF LOWERING THE LEVELS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES.

11. THE HUNGARIAN DELEGATION FULLY SHARES AND SUPPORTS THE APPROACH SET OUT BY THE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. WITH OUR ALLIES WE SUPPOSE THAT IT IS ON THE BASIS OF SUCH AN APPROACH THAT THE MOST REALISTIC AND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PLAN CAN BE WORKED OUT FOR THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

12. BUT WHAT HAS BEEN SAID AND WHAT HAS BEEN PROPOSED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE QUESTION WHICH I DESCRIBED AS FUNDAMENTAL?

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13. OF THE SEVEN WESTERN STATES WHICH ARE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS, SO FAR ONLY THE UNITED STATES HAVE BEEN DISPLAYING READINESS TO BE INCLUDED FROM THE VERY BEGINNING IN THE PROCESS OF REDUCTION. SIX DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE WESTERN SIDE, AS THEIR STATEMENTS SHOW, ARE AVOIDING DIRECT AND UNAMBIGUOUS DECLARATIONS AS TO WHEN AND IN WHAT QUANTITY THEY ARE READY TO REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

14. DESPITE THE NUMEROUS DEMANDS WHICH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN MAKING NOW FOR SEVERAL WEEKS, THIS CENTRAL QUESTION IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS STILL REMAINS WITHOUT A REPLY FROM THE SIX WESTERN COUNTRIES. INSTEAD OF CONFIRMING THEIR PREVIOUS DECLARATION WITH REGARD TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS THEY SPEAK - AND THIS HAS BEEN REPEATED MORE THAN ONCE -

ONLY OF THEIR READINESS - AND THIS GIVEN THE CARRYING OUT OF CONDITIONS PUT FORWARD BY THEM - TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN SOME INDEFINITE SECOND PHASE, AND MOREOVER, HOWEVER STRANGE IT MAY SEEM, CONCERNING THE REDUCTION ONLY OF GROUND TROOPS. IN THIS CONNECTION I WOULD LIKE TO REMARK THAT THE POSING OF PRECONDITIONS COULD LEAD US TO INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES.

15. SPEAKING OF THE APPROACH OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, WE

SHOULD LIKE ONCE AGAIN TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT NOW, WHEN WE SHOULD BE DISCUSSING THE MEANS OF EMBODYING IN A MUTUALLY BINDING AGREEMENT THE IDEA OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE ALREADY DEFINED AREA, OUR WESTERN PARTNERS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE PASSING OVER IN SILENCE A CONDITION ON WHICH THEY THEMSELVES FORMERLY INSISTED, NAMELY THE CONDITION THAT THE AGREEMENT MUST EMBRACE BOTH FOREIGN AND NATIONAL ARMED FORCES, AS WELL AS THEIR ARMAMENTS, IN THE RELEVAT AREA. THE QUESTION ARISES - WHAT IS THE CAUSE OF THIS TURNABOUT?

16. THE INITIAL POSITION OF THE NATO COUNTRIES WAS SET FORTH IN THE OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS PRESENTED BY THE SEVEN WESTERN DELEGATIONS ON 22 NOVEMBER OF LAST YEAR. IT PROPOSES THE REDUCTION ONLY OF GROUND TROPS, AND MOREOVER ON AN UNEQUAL BASIS. OTHER TYPES OF ARMED FORCES - AIRFORCES AND UNITS EQUIPPED WITH

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS - ARE COMPLETELY IGNORED. IT IS PROPOSED TO LEAVE THEM OUTSIDE THE REDUCTIONS, AS THOUGH THEY PLAY NO ROLE IN WESTERN DOCTRINES, ABOUT WHICH WE OFTEN HEAR AND READ - OF "MUTUAL TERROR" OR OF "EQUILIBRIUM OF FEAR", IN OTHER WORDS IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF ARMED FORCES WHICH HAS DEVELOPED HISTORICALLY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

17. ACCORDING TO THE OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS THERE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED EQUAL "COMMON CEILINGS" FOR GROUND TROOPS OF EACH OF THE GROUPINGS, IN ADDITION TO WHICH IT WOULD BE INCUMBENT UPON THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO REDUCE THE PERSONNEL OF THEIR GROUND TROOPS MUCH MORE THAN THE NATO COUNTRIES.

18. IN CONNCTION WITH THIS WE SOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THE PROPOSAL OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE SOCIALIST STATES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS HAVING TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF THEIR ARMED FORCES MORE THAN TWO AND A HALF TIMES AS MUCH AS THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, IS UNREALISTIC AND UNACCEPTABLE. IF WE IMAGINE EVEN FOR A MOMENT THAT SUCH AN

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USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11

OMB-01 SAM-01 DRC-01 /162 W
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R 041851Z APR 74

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 VIENNA 3026

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: HUNGARIAN PLENARY STATEMENT OF
APRIL 4, 1974

UNEQUAL DEMAND WERE MADE BY US TO THE WESTERN STATES, IT IS
COMPLETELY OBVIOUS THAT THEY WOULD HAVE REJECTED IT.

19. EUROPEAN STATES WHICH ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE AREA OF
REDUCTION CANNOT BE INDIFFERENT TO WHAT WILL BE THE RESULT OF
THE REDUCTION OF TROOPS AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE
MILITARY POLITICAL SITUATION PRESENTLY EXISTING IN EUROPE HAS
SERVED AS A BASIS FOR THOSE FAVOURABLE CHANGES ON THIS
CONTINENT OF WHICH WE ARE THE WITNESSES, AND ANY ATTEMPTS TO
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CHANGE THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES THROUGH UNEQUAL
REDUCTIONS, HOWEVER SUCH ATTEMPTS ARE JUSTIFIED, CANNOT FAIL
TO EVOKE COMPLETELY LEGITIMATE DOUBTS AND SUSPICIONS AS TO
THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THIS IS BEING DONE.

20. THE APPROACH OF THE NATO COUNTRIES IS BUILT ON THE SO-
CALLED CONCEPT OF DISPARITIES. I AND MY COLLEAGUES HAVE ALREADY

POINTED OUT ITS LACK OF SUBSTANCE AND UNACCEPTABILITY BOTH AS A WHOLE, AND IN ITS INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS. WITH THE AID OF THIS CONCEPT AND ON THE BASIS OF ARBITRARITY SELECTED PREMISES FROM AN EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES A CONCLUSION IS DRAWN CONCERNING AN "UNSTABLE SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE". HOWEVER, WHEN READING AND REREADING THE UTTERANCES OF MILITARY-POLITICAL LEADERS OF MANY WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF NATO COUNCIL SESSIONS, IN WHICH ARE MENTIONED "THE MAINTENANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT MILITARY POTENTIAL OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE" AND "RELIABLE DEFENCE", ONE CAN HARDLY COME TO SUCH CONCLUSIONS AS THOSE ABOUT WHICH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES SPEAK. WE ARE NOT EVERN SPEAKING OF THE FACT THAT THE INCREASE OF THE MILITARY MIGHT OF NATO COMPRISES THE MAIN CONTENT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY GROUPING.

21. THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF DISPARITIES DOES NOT WITHSTAND CRITICISM ALSO FROM THE POINT OF VIEW THAT IT IS BASED ON ARTIFICIALLY AND ARBITRARITY SELECTED FIGURES AND CALCULATIONS, IN THE SELECTION OF WHICH ITS AUTHORS- INTENTIONALLY OR NOT- IGNORE THE EXISTING STRUCTURE OF ARMED FORCES IN VARIOUS STATES, INCLUDING GROUND TROOPS.

22. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT WHAT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION, AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV, EMPHASISED IN HIS STATEMENT OF 21 MARCH THIS YEAR CORRESPONDS TO GENUINE REALITY, NAMELY: "OVER THE COURSE OF A PROLONGED PERIOD THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE HAS BEEN CONSIDERED BY BOTH SIDES TO BE ENSURING A DEFINITE STABILITY".

23. WHEN ONE TAKES INTO CONSIDERATION THE CIRCUMSTANCES SET FORTH ABOVE, ONE IS COMPLETELY JUSTIFIED IN DRAWING THE CONCLUSION THAT THE APPROACH PROPOSED BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES

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CONTAINED IN THEIR OUTLINE IS CLEARLY AIMED AT GAINING UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES BY THOSE STATES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE OTHER SIDE. IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE CLEARLY STATED THAT THEY WILL NOT AGREE TO CONFERRING SUCH ADVANTAGES ON THEIR PARTNERS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, ALL THE MORE BECAUSE THEY THEMSELVES ARE NOT STRIVING TO OBTAIN ANY UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES FOR THEMSELVES.

24. THUS, MR CHAIRMAN, THE CONCLUSION CANNOT BE AVOIDED THAT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TWO BASICALLY DIFFERING APPROACHES TO THE EXAMINATION AND SOLUTION OF THE QUESTIONS FACING US AHVE BEEN CLEARLY REVEALED. AS IS OBVIOUS FROM THE COMPARISON OF THEM GREAT DIFFICULTIES STAND ON THE PATH TO REACHING A

SOLUTION OF MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS
IN CENTRAL EUROPE. NEVERTHELESS WE CONSIDER THAT THEY CAN
BE COMPLETELY OVERCOME, IF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ALSO WILL
STAND ON THE GROUND OF OBJECTIVITY AND REALISM AND PROCEED
FROM A COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE
EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES, WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR THE
WORKING OUT OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CONCRETE MEASURES OF
REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. A SYMBOLIC
REDUCTION, A PROPOSAL BY THE SOCIALIST STATES, COULD BE VERY
WELL BE SUCH A MEASURE AS A FIRST STEP.

END TEXT. HUMES

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ALLIANCE, NEGOTIATIONS, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 04 APR 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974VIENNA03026
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740077-0223
From: VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740465/aaaachhl.tel
Line Count: 451
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 MAR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <06 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: HUNGARIAN PLENARY STATEMENT OF APRIL 4, 1974
TAGS: PARM, HU, NATO, WTO, MBFR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005